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F L E X I B L E  S C H E D U L I N G  A N D  G E N D E R  E Q U A L I T Y :
T H E  W O R K I N G  F A M I L I E S  F L E X I B I L I T Y  A C T
U N D E R  T H E  F O U R T E E N T H  A M E N D M E N T
ane  . owell*
The Working Families Flexibility Act (“WFFA”) as proposed
in 2012 would create a federal right for employees to request flexible
work arrangements. However, the bill contains no private right of
action for employees to enforce this new right. By reframing the
WFFA as an anti-discrimination statute targeting unconstitutional
sex discrimination on the part of the States, the WFFA could be
upheld under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, allowing
Congress to provide a private right of action for both private and
state employees. This Note uses the Supreme Court’s decisions on the
Family Medical Leave Act in Hibbs and Coleman as the basis for
analyzing how the WFFA might be upheld under the Enforcement
Clause. It also argues that, in order to advance workplace equality,
the WFFA should be reframed to target “work-life” balance, rather
than specifically “work-family” balance. Because caregiving is so fre-
quently viewed as a women’s issue, as long as flexible scheduling is
understood as a policy for caregivers, it will be seen as a policy for
women and carry the burden of stereotypes associated with working
mothers. To make fundamental improvements in workplace gender
equality, we need to decouple the link between flexible scheduling
and caregiving.
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INTRODUCTION
In June 2012, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Professor of Politics and Interna-
tional Affairs at Princeton University, former Director of Policy Planning
for the U.S. State Department and former Dean of Princeton’s Woodrow
Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, wrote an article in The
Atlantic entitled, Why Women Still Can’t Have It All.1 Slaughter argues that
women cannot “have it all” because the current socioeconomic structure of
our country forces women to struggle to balance their careers and their
families.2 She concludes that women need “to stop accepting male behavior
and male choices as the default and the ideal,” and need to shape their own
career paths to create a society that works for women.3 This call to action
surely resonates with women facing the conflicting pulls of work and family
that Slaughter so aptly describes. But advocating for women to reject the
male-centric demands of the modern workforce in order to achieve both
career and family success is a far stretch from women actually being able to
do so. The experience of Mary Matalin, former assistant to President
George W. Bush and counselor to Vice President Dick Cheney, who
stepped down from her job to spend more time with her children, reveals
this gap. Slaughter quotes Matalin: “Having control over your schedule is
the only way that women who want to have a career and a family can make
it work.”4
1. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why Women Still Can’t Have It All, THE ATLANTIC (June 13,
2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/07/why-women-still-
cant-have-it-all/309020/.
2. Id. at 1.
3. Id. at 6.
4. Id. at 1.
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Flexible scheduling is one policy that could provide a solution to
work-family conflict.5 The idea behind flexible scheduling is not that em-
ployees should be allowed to work less, but that they should be allowed
flexibility in when they work or from where they do so. Some private busi-
nesses have already implemented rules that allow employees to have flexible
work arrangements.6 These rules may include allowing employees to work
compressed workweeks where they work more hours on fewer days; to alter
the starting or ending times of their workdays; or to telework from home.7
The federal government provides federal agencies discretion to establish
flexible or compressed work schedules as options for their employees.8 How-
ever, while flexible work arrangements are becoming more common, they
are by no means prevalent.9 If having control over one’s work schedule is
going to be a real option for a more significant percentage of American
workers, flexible scheduling policies need to become the norm in American
workplaces. In 2007, 2009, and again in 2012, Congress introduced the
Working Families Flexibility Act, which aimed to facilitate this change in
workplace culture.10
This Note examines the Working Families Flexibility Act (“WFFA” or
“Act”), which would create the right for employees to request flexible work
arrangements.11 Part I discusses the provisions of the bill as proposed in
5. See, e.g., Workplace Flexibility 2010, GEORGETOWN L., http://www.workplaceflexi-
bility2010.org (last visited Nov. 9, 2013); Kenneth Matos & Ellen Galinsky, Work-
place Flexibility in the United States: A Status Report, FAMILIES & WORK INST. 1
(2010), http://familiesandwork.org/site/research/reports/www_us_workflex.pdf
[hereinafter Workplace Flexibility] (discussing The White House Workplace Flexibil-
ity Forum, hosted by the White House Council on Women and Girls in 2010).
6. See, e.g., Kenneth Matos & Ellen Galinsky, 2012 National Study of Employers, FAMI-
LIES & WORK INST. 12 (2012), http://familiesandwork.org/site/research/reports/
NSE_2012.pdf [hereinafter National Study].
7. Id. at 14.
8. Georgetown Law Fed. Legislation Clinic, The Federal Employees Flexible and Com-
pressed Work Schedules Act (FEFCWA), GEORGETOWN U. L. CENTER 1 (2006),
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1014&context=
legal.
9. According to a study by the Families and Work Institute, in 2012 only 7% of em-
ployers allowed all or most of their employees to work a compressed workweek; only
27% allowed all or most employees to periodically change their starting and quitting
times; and only 2% allowed all or most employees to work some paid hours at home
occasionally. National Study, supra note 6, at 14.
10. Working Families Flexibility Act, H.R. 4106, 112th Cong. (2012); Working Fami-
lies Flexibility Act, S. 2142, 112th Cong. (2012); Working Families Flexibility Act,
H.R. 1274, 111th Cong. (2009); Working Families Flexibility Act, S. 3840, 111th
Cong. (2009); Working Families Flexibility Act, H.R. 4301, 110th Cong. (2007);
Working Families Flexibility Act, S. 2419, 110th Cong. (2007).
11. S. 2142. On May 9, 2013, the House passed the Working Families Flexibility Act of
2013, which would allow workers to accrue compensatory time, or paid time off, in
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2012 and highlights how the bill’s enforcement provisions fail to provide a
private right of action for employees to enforce their rights under the Act.
Part II explores how the bill could provide a private right of action for
both private and state employees. To do so, Congress would have to reframe
the WFFA as an anti-discrimination statute targeting unconstitutional be-
havior on the part of the States, thus allowing the WFFA to be upheld
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, otherwise known as the
Enforcement Clause. This Part uses the Supreme Court’s decision uphold-
ing the constitutionality of the family-leave provision of the FMLA in
Hibbs, and the Court’s subsequent decision to strike down the FMLA’s self-
leave provision in Coleman, as the basis for analyzing how the WFFA might
be upheld under the Enforcement Clause.
Part III argues that, in order to truly advance workplace equality, the
WFFA needs to target “work-life” balance broadly, not simply “work-fam-
ily” balance. This Part argues that, because caregiving is so closely associated
with women,12 as long as flexible scheduling is seen as a policy for
caregivers, it will be seen as a policy for women and therefore will carry the
burden of stereotypes associated with working mothers. Flexible scheduling
could improve gender equality in the workplace, but only if employees and
employers see the policy as equally applicable to men and women, parents
and non-parents. To make fundamental improvements in workplace gender
equality, we need to decouple the link between flexible scheduling and
caregiving.
exchange for their overtime hours worked, rather than taking overtime pay. H.R.
1460, 113th Cong. (2013). That bill is an updated version of a bill first introduced
in 1996, then called the Working Families Flexibility Act of 1996. H.R. REP. NO.
104-670 (1996). The Working Families Flexibility Act of 2013 does not relate to the
type of policies this Note terms “flexible scheduling.” This Note was begun prior to
the introduction of the Working Families Flexibility Act of 2013 and addresses the
2012 bill of similar title but different content.
12. See, e.g., Ellen Galinsky, Kerstin Aumann & James T. Bond, 2008 National Study of
the Changing Workforce: Times are Changing, FAMILIES & WORK INST. 14
(2011),http://familiesandwork.org/site/research/reports/Times_Are_Changing.pdf;
Gary N. Powell, The Sex Difference in Employee Inclinations Regarding Work-Family
Programs: Why Does It Exist, Should We Care, and What Should Be Done about It (If
Anything)?, in INTEGRATING WORK AND FAMILY: CHALLENGES AND CHOICES FOR
A CHANGING WORLD 167, 168 (Saroj Parasuraman & Jeffrey H. Greenhaus eds.,
1999).
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I. THE WORKING FAMILIES FLEXIBILITY ACT OF 2012
A. Statutory Purpose and Substantive Provisions of the WFFA
The WFFA is framed—by its factual findings, in its legislative history,
and by its sponsors—as a bill to combat work-family conflict. Part 2 of the
WFFA sets forth Congress’ factual findings, which function to explain Con-
gress’ reasoning behind the Act.13 The Act’s findings begin by highlighting
the changing demographics of the country’s workforce, including the in-
crease in both the number of women working and the number of families
“headed by either a working single parent or [two] working parents.”14 Its
findings also indicate an increase in the number of households caring for
older relatives or for family members with special needs.15 The findings then
discuss how flexible work arrangements allow employees to balance work
and family life more easily.16
Representative Caroline Maloney introduced the WFFA in 2012.17
On her personal website she argues that “even a modest change in an em-
ployee’s work schedule can make a difference in whether or not a parent or
caregiver can stay in the workforce.”18 She asserts that the WFFA will help
“families across the country by putting in place a process for employees to
request a temporary or permanent change in their work schedules.”19 In her
introduction of the Act, she cited the demographic changes described in the
bill’s findings, including the statistics about working parents and house-
holds caring for older or disabled relatives, and declared that “flexible work
arrangements are the key to meeting the [ ] diverse workforce needs” of
13. S. 2142, § 2.
14. S. 2142, § 2(1)–(3).
15. S. 2142, § 2(2)–(3).
16. S. 2142, § 2(3).
17. 158 CONG. REC. E282-03 (daily ed. Feb. 29, 2012) (statement of Rep. Carolyn B.
Maloney). A bill under the name Working Families Flexibility Act was first intro-
duced in 1996 and was designed to provide paid comp time for hourly workers in
lieu of overtime pay. See Comp Time in Lieu of Overtime Pay for Hourly Workers:
Hearing Before the House of Reps.,105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Linda M. Smith,
medical staff credentialing coordinator and secretary, Bascom Palmer Eye Institute ),
1997 WL 44958. Senator Edward Kennedy reintroduced the Working Families Flex-
ibility Act in 2007 as a bill designed to grant workers the right to request flexible
schedules. 153 CONG. REC. S14849-01, (daily ed. Dec. 6, 2007) (statement of Sen.
Edward Kennedy). This 2007 bill was in essence the same as the bill introduced
most recently in 2012 by Representative Maloney, and reflects the bill as it is known
today. S. 2142, § 2.
18. Working Families Flexibility Act, CONGRESSWOMAN CAROLYN B. MALONEY, http://
maloney.house.gov/issue/working-families-flexibility-act (last visited Nov. 9, 2013).
19. Id.
364 M I C H I G A N  J O U R N A L  O F  G E N D E R &  L A W [Vol. 20:359
these caregivers.20 This language demonstrates that the bill’s House sponsor
understands the Act as targeted at work-family conflict.
The sponsors of the WFFA also highlight the benefits flexible work
arrangements provide for businesses.21 Senator Bob Casey, introducing the
bill in the Senate in 2010 for himself and Senator Tom Harkin, claimed:
“For employers, [flexibility] means less turn over, higher morale and more
productive employees.”22 The Act’s findings support this statement, noting
that benefits to businesses include increased employee satisfaction, reten-
tion, productivity, and effectiveness.23 Although the bill and its sponsors
tout its positive implications for employers, the facts and arguments that
they choose to place first, along with the title of the Act itself, indicate that
the primary purpose of the WFFA is to help employees experiencing work-
family conflict.
The WFFA gives all employees the “statutory right to request flexible
work terms and conditions.”24 An employee may submit to his or her em-
ployer a written request for a temporary or permanent change in (1) the
number of hours the employee works, (2) the times when the employee
works, (3) the location of the employee’s work, or (4) the amount of notifi-
cation given to the employee of work schedule assignments.25 In the em-
ployee’s application, the employee must explain the anticipated effects that
the requested change will have on the employer and potential ways to miti-
gate any such effect.26 The employee does not need to state his or her reason
for requesting the change.
An employer receiving an application under the WFFA has a duty to
“consider” the application in accordance with regulations to be issued under
the Act.27 The Act specifies that these regulations will include provisions
requiring that the employer and employee meet to discuss the application.28
The provisions will also require the employer to give the employee a written
20. 158 CONG. REC. E282-03 (daily ed. Feb. 29, 2012) (statement of Rep. Carolyn B.
Maloney).
21. See, e.g., S. 2142, § 2(3); 158 CONG. REC. E282-03 (daily ed. Feb. 29, 2012) (state-
ment of Rep. Carolyn B. Maloney); Working Families Flexibility Act, supra note 18.
22. 156 CONG. REC. S7447-01 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 2010) (statement of Sen. Bob
Casey).
23. S. 2142, § 2(4).
24. S. 2142, § 4.
25. S. 2142, § 4(a).
26. S. 2142, § 4(b).
27. S. 2142, § 5(a). Depending on the covered employee in question, these regulations
will be issued by the Secretary of Labor; the Comptroller General of the United
States and the Librarian of Congress; the Board of Directors of the Office of Com-
pliance; the President; or the Director of the Office of Personnel Management. S.
2142, § 13.
28. S. 2142, § 5(b)(1)(A).
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decision on the application.29 Rejections of applications must state the em-
ployer’s grounds for the decision.30 The employer may propose an alterna-
tive change if it rejects the employee’s application.31
B. Enforcement of the WFFA as Currently Written
As currently proposed, the Secretary of Labor would enforce the
WFFA.32 Section 7 of the WFFA sets forth this method of enforcement.33
Section 7 does not create a private right of action for employees to enforce
the WFFA against their employers. Instead, “[a]n employee who is affected
by a violation of a right [provided by the WFFA] . . . may make a complaint
to the Secretary of Labor . . .”34 The Secretary “shall receive, investigate, and
attempt to resolve such complaints of violations in the same manner as the
Secretary [does] . . . complaints of violations of . . . the Fair Labor Standards
Act [(“FLSA”)] . . . .”35 According to Section 8 of the WFFA, if the Secre-
tary finds there has been a violation, the Secretary may assess a civil penalty
against the employer.36 If the Secretary finds a violation of Section 6, which
prohibits inter alia employer retaliation against employees for exercising
rights under the Act,37 the Secretary may order “such equitable relief as may
be appropriate, including employment reinstatement, promotion, back pay,
and a change in the terms or conditions of employment.”38
There are major disadvantages to this bureaucratic method of enforc-
ing the WFFA, already evidenced by problems in enforcing the FLSA.39
Although private employees have a private right of action under the FLSA,
after the Supreme Court decisions of Seminole Tribe v. Florida and Alden v.
29. S. 2142, § 5(b)(1)(B).
30. S. 2142, § 5(b)(1)(C).
31. S. 2142, § 5(b)(1)(D).
32. S. 2142, § 7(b).
33. S. 2142, § 7.
34. S. 2142, § 7(b)(1).
35. Id. The Fair Labor Standards Act was passed under Congress’ Commerce Clause
power and provides universal benefits, including setting a minimum wage and maxi-
mum work hours, for employees who meet basic employment requirements. Arnold
v. Arkansas, 957 F. Supp. 185, 187 (E.D. Ark. 1996) (“There is no doubt that in
enacting the FLSA, Congress was exercising its power pursuant to the Interstate
Commerce Clause.”); Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 203, 206, 207
(Westlaw through P.L. 113-36 (excluding P.L. 113-34) (approved 9-18-13)).
36. S. 2142, §§ 7(b)(1), 8(a)(1).
37. S. 2142, § 6(b).
38. S. 2142, § 8(a)(2).
39. See, e.g., Heather Lueke, A Right Without A Remedy: State Employees After Seminole
Tribe and Alden, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 217 (2001); Raymond J. Farrow,
Qualifying Immunity: Protecting State Employees’ Right to Protect Their Employment
Rights After Alden v. Maine, 76 WASH. L. REV. 149, 149–50 (2001).
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Maine, state employees do not.40 They must file a complaint with the De-
partment of Labor (“DOL”).41 While under the FLSA the DOL “does in-
vestigate employers based on employee complaints, neither the majority of
its manpower nor budget allocations are devoted to these investigations.
The DOL itself [has] state[d] [in annual accountability reports and per-
formance reviews] that it does not find complaint-based actions effective for
deterring or remedying violations of the FLSA.”42 The inability of state em-
ployees to bring private actions against their employers has made it difficult
for these employees to protect their rights under the FLSA.43 These
problems will apply equally to the proposed employee complaint system set
forth in the WFFA. In addition, unlike the FLSA, the WFFA creates no
separate private right of action for private employees. Under the WFFA, all
employees who wish to enforce rights under the WFFA will have to enforce
those rights through complaints to the DOL. If the DOL already lacks the
budget and staff to investigate sufficiently all the state claims arising under
the FLSA,44 then adding the burden of investigating all complaints under
the WFFA will compound the problem.
If the rights provided to employees by the WFFA are to be meaning-
ful, employees need to be able to bring private suits against their employers.
In Seminole Tribe and Alden, the Court held that Congress cannot subject
the States to private suits for damages in either federal court or state court
when acting under its Article I powers.45 As currently written, the WFFA
appears to use the Commerce Clause as its source of congressional author-
ity.46 Under the Commerce Clause, Congress could create a private right of
action in the WFFA for private employees, but not for state employees.
While this potential avenue of relief for private employees is promising, it is
not sufficient. Given the inadequacy of the DOL complaint system,47 one
40. Lueke, supra note 39, at 217–18.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Farrow, supra note 39, at 177.
44. See Lueke, supra note 39, at 218.
45. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72–73 (1996); Alden v. Maine, 527
U.S. 706, 712 (1999).
46. In addition to the factual findings in Part II relating to the impact of flexible work
on businesses, the fact that the WFFA makes no distinction between private and
state employees in the enforcement provisions in section 7 or the remedies provided
by section 8 is a strong indication that Congress intends the WFFA to fall under its
Commerce Clause power. Sections 7 and 8 are consistent with the enforcement
power and remain available remedies left to state employees by the Supreme Court
after Seminole Tribe and Alden. See Lueke, supra note 39, at 217–18.
47. See id.
2013] F L E X I B L E  S C H E D U L I N G  A N D  G E N D E R  E Q U A L I T Y 367
could argue that over 3.7 million state employees would be functionally
unable to enforce their rights under the Act.48
II. THE WORKING FAMILIES FLEXIBILITY ACT UNDER THE
14 TH AMENDMENT
In order for Congress to grant state employees a private right of action
against their employers, Congress must abrogate the States’ Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity.49 To do so, (1) Congress must unequivo-
cally express its intent to abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity, and (2)
Congress must act pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority.50
Although Congress cannot abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity under
the Commerce Clause,51 Congress can do so when it acts pursuant to a valid
exercise of its authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, also
known as the Enforcement Clause.52
Thus, if Congress wants to provide a private right of action for state
employees under the WFFA, Congress must be able to pass—and the Court
must uphold—the WFFA under the Enforcement Clause. In City of Boerne
v. Flores, the Court articulated that in order for legislation to constitute a
valid exercise of congressional authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, there must be “congruence and proportionality between the
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.”53
When determining whether legislation is “congruent and proportional,”
courts must (1) identify the constitutional right or rights that Congress in-
tended the legislation to protect;54 (2) determine “whether Congress identi-
fied a history and pattern of unconstitutional . . . discrimination by the
48. According to the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2011 Annual Survey of Public Employment
and Payroll, there were 3,779,258 full time employees of state governments. U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, 2011 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT AND PAYROLL DATA (2011), available
at http://www2.census.gov/govs/apes/11stus.txt.
49. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 517 (2004).
50. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 517; Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356,
363 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000).
51. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72–73 (1996); Alden v. Maine, 527
U.S. 706, 712 (1999).
52. See, e.g., Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 758 (2003); Lane, 541
U.S. at 518. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment states: “No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
53. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
54. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365; Lane, 541 U.S. at 522.
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States;”55 and (3) determine whether the legislation “is an appropriate re-
sponse to this history and pattern of unequal treatment.”56
The Supreme Court’s analysis of the family-leave provision of the
Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) in Nevada Department of Human Re-
sources v. Hibbs57 provides a guide for how the Court might find the WFFA
to be a valid exercise of Congress’ power under Section 5. The WFFA as
currently proposed is geared toward accommodating the caregiving needs of
employees.58 This purpose is similar to that of the family-leave provision of
the FMLA, which provides employees with up to twelve weeks of unpaid
leave from work if the employee’s spouse, child, or parent is suffering from a
“serious health condition.”59 Like the WFFA, the FMLA provides a univer-
sal benefit to all employees who meet basic employment requirements,60 but
it is understood to be an anti-discrimination statute and has been upheld as
such under Congress’ Section 5 enforcement power.61
In Hibbs, the Court found that, by passing the FMLA, Congress
sought to enforce “the [constitutional] right to be free from gender-based
discrimination in the workplace.”62 The Court found that Congress had
evidence of a long history of unconstitutional sex discrimination in the
workplace.63 In addition to a history of laws that blatantly excluded women
from the workplace,64 “States had family-leave policies that differentiated on
the basis of sex.”65 For example, employers offered maternity leave that was
far longer than physically necessary for women recovering from childbirth,
while offering no paternity leave.66 The Court noted that “[t]his and other
differential leave policies were not attributable to any differential physical
needs of men and women, but rather to the pervasive sex-role stereotype
that caring for family members is women’s work.”67
55. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368.
56. Lane, 541 U.S. at 530.
57. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 725.
58. See Working Families Flexibility Act, S. 2142, 112th Cong. § 2 (2012).
59. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (Westlaw through 2013
P.L. 113-31); Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 724.
60. S. 2142, § 3(2) (requiring that employees meet the general statutory definition and
work at least twenty hours per week or 1,000 hours per year); FMLA § 2611.
61. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 728, 740. Unlike the FMLA, however, the WFFA does not
create an automatic right to accommodation by one’s employer. It only creates the
“right to request” a schedule change. S. 2142 § 4.
62. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 728.
63. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 729.
64. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 729.
65. Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1332 (2012) (plurality opin-
ion) (citing Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 727).
66. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 731.
67. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 731.
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The Court also found that the States administered facially neutral
family-leave policies in discriminatory ways because granting leave or deter-
mining its length was left to the discretion of employers or individual super-
visors.68 The Court ultimately found that this history of unconstitutional
discrimination in the administration of family leave benefits warranted
“prophylactic [Section 5] legislation,” or legislation “that proscribes facially
constitutional conduct, in order to prevent and deter unconstitutional con-
duct.”69 Finally, the Court found that the family-leave provision of the
FMLA was a congruent and proportional remedy to the identified constitu-
tional violation because Congress had already tried traditional anti-discrimi-
nation legislation with Title VII but continued to face “a difficult and
intractable problem” with sex discrimination, and the FMLA was narrowly
targeted and limited in scope.70
This application of the Boerne test in Hibbs provides a guide for how
the Supreme Court might also uphold the WFFA under the Fourteenth
Amendment. First, the Court must be able to recognize that the WFFA
seeks to enforce the same right as the FMLA—the right to be free from
gender-based discrimination in the workplace.71 Second, the Court would
need to be able to identify a history of unconstitutional gender discrimina-
tion that the legislation targets.72 Finally, the Court must be able to find
that the WFFA is a congruent and proportional remedy to the constitu-
tional violation it seeks to correct.73
A. Finding a History of Unconstitutional Discrimination
As discussed in Part I, the WFFA is currently framed as a solution to
the changing composition of the American workforce and the caregiving
demands on American workers.74 This Part will discuss three potential ways
that the WFFA could be reframed as a remedy to unconstitutional gender
discrimination by the States. Option 1 analyzes the argument that the lack
of flexible scheduling for state employees discriminates against women be-
68. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 732.
69. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 727–28.
70. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 737–40.
71. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 735. Congress could easily make this clear in the text of the Act.
Beyond this presumed change, Parts A and B of Part II will assume that Congress
leaves the substantive provisions of the WFFA as currently written.
72. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 524–25 (2004); Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 728;
Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001).
73. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 530 (“The only question that remains is whether Title II is an
appropriate response to this history and pattern of unequal treatment.”); City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997).
74. Working Families Flexibility Act, S. 2142, 112th Cong. § 2 (2012).
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cause women are most often the primary household caregivers. Option 2
examines the argument that existing state flexible scheduling policies dis-
criminate against women in their text or administration. Option 3 argues
that there is purposeful gender discrimination in how women are treated
after they begin working flexible schedules and proposes adding an anti-
retaliation provision to the WFFA to address this problem.
Option 1: Lack of Flexible Scheduling Discriminates against Women as
Primary Caregivers
One possible argument for upholding the WFFA under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment is that women tend to be their families’ pri-
mary caregiver and, as such, are affected more by a lack of flexibility in their
work schedules. In her statement to the Senate in support of the WFFA,
Judith Lichtman, Senior Advisor for the National Partnership for Women &
Families, stated that “women continue to have primary responsibility for
family caregiving” despite the fact that they “now make up half of America’s
workforce.”75 Although fathers are spending more time with their children
today than they have in the past, “mothers still spend significantly more
time per workday, on average, caring for their children.”76 Even when both
parents work full time, women still bear more of the domestic
responsibilities.77
Professor Joan Williams argues that “[e]mployers discriminate against
women when they structure work to require employees . . . to have gender
privileges typically available only to men.”78 The “ideal-worker norm,” also
called the “full-time, face-time norm,” is used by scholars to describe tradi-
tional employment structures where workers are assumed to have no
caregiving or domestic responsibilities.79 The nine to five, five-day work-
week was designed for men who had wives at home to care for their children
and households.80 Moreover, even this work schedule is more conducive to
caregiving responsibilities than the schedule afforded to many in either very
75. Beyond Mother’s Day: Helping the Middle Class Balance Work and Family: Hearing
before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, and Pensions, 112th Cong. 1 (2012)
(statement of Judith L. Lichtman, Senior Advisor, National Partnership for Women
& Families).
76. Galinsky et al., supra note 12.
77. Powell, supra note 12.
78. JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY WORK AND FAMILY CONFLICT AND
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 76 (2001).
79. Rachel Arnow-Richman, Incenting Flexibility: The Relationship Between Public Law
and Voluntary Action in Enhancing Work/Life Balance, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1081, 1083
(2010); WILLIAMS, supra note 78, at 64.
80. WILLIAMS, supra note 78, at 64.
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high-powered or very low-wage jobs, where hours may be unpredictable or
fall at any time of the day or night. There is a strong argument that requir-
ing workers to conform to schedules designed without caregiving needs in
mind has a discriminatory effect on women, and the WFFA is designed to
target and remedy this discrimination.
This disparate impact argument poses a problem for upholding Con-
gress’ ability to pass the WFFA under the Enforcement Clause. The heart of
the argument is that inflexible work scheduling policies have a greater im-
pact on women than on men. This argument was rejected as a basis for
upholding the FMLA’s self-care provision under the Enforcement Clause in
Coleman.81 There, the Court stated that although neutral self-care leave re-
strictions might have a disparate impact on women because most single
parents are women, evidence of disparate impact “alone is insufficient [to
prove a constitutional violation] even where the Fourteenth Amendment
subjects state action to strict scrutiny.”82 In order for the WFFA to apply to
the States under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, there must be
not only a neutral state policy with a discriminatory effect, but also discrim-
inatory administration of the policy by the State.83
Option 2: Flexible Scheduling Policies Discriminate against Women
Another argument for upholding the WFFA under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment is that women are suffering intentional discrimina-
tion from the flexible scheduling policies currently offered by the States.
This argument tracks the one upheld for the FMLA’s family-leave provision
in Hibbs84 and found absent for the FMLA’s self-care provision in
Coleman.85
The self-care provision of the FMLA at issue in Coleman was struck
down in part because the Court found that Congress’ concern when passing
that provision was really “a concern for discrimination on the basis of ill-
ness, not sex.”86 This finding leaves the WFFA vulnerable to the argument
that Congress is actually concerned about discrimination on the basis of
caregiving responsibilities, rather than on the basis of sex. One response to
this argument is that, given that women are typically the primary caregivers
in families, discrimination against those with caregiving responsibilities is
81. Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1333, 1337 (2012) (plurality
opinion).
82. Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1337 (citing Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S.
356, 372–73 (2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
83. See Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1334 (explaining the holding in Hibbs).
84. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 735 (2003).
85. See Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1334–35.
86. Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1335.
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really discrimination against women. In Coleman, the Court cites the
FMLA’s finding that “due to the nature of the roles of men and women in
our society, the primary responsibility for family caretaking often falls on
women, and such responsibility affects the working lives of women more
than it affects the working lives of men.”87 This quote shows that the Court
already recognizes that caregiving responsibilities are often gendered, and so
the argument that concern for discrimination on the basis of caregiving is
really concern for discrimination on the basis of sex will not be difficult to
make.
Unlike the state family-leave policies cited by Chief Justice Rehnquist
in Hibbs,88 state flexible scheduling policies are not facially discriminatory.
Most state laws relating to flexible scheduling do not even mention families
or caregiving.89 If they do, they use gender-neutral language, saying, for
example, that agencies should develop alternative work schedules “to assist
state employees in meeting the needs of their families.”90 Thus, the Court
will not be able to find that state flexible scheduling policies are facially
discriminatory. The Court, however, could still find state conduct violating
the Constitution if States administer their facially neutral policies in a dis-
criminatory way.91
In Coleman, Justice Kennedy highlighted that “[n]othing in the record
shows employers formulated self-care leave policies based on [the] view”
that “women take self-care leave more often than men.”92 There is evidence
that the same is not true for flexible scheduling policies.93 James Levine,
Director of the Fatherhood Project at the Families and Work Institute, ar-
87. Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1335 (quoting FMLA, 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(5)).
88. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 733 (“[S]even States had childcare leave provisions that applied to
women only.”).
89. See Georgetown Law, Flexible Work Arrangements, WORKPLACE FLEXIBILITY 2010,
http://workplaceflexibility2010.org/index.php/policy_components/flexible_work_ar-
rangements/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2013) (follow “Examples of State Flexible Work
Arrangements (FWA) Laws (Chart)” hyperlink).
90. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74 § 840-2.26 (Westlaw through 2013 Legis. Sess.).
91. See Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1334.
92. Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1334–35 (plurality opinion).
93. As Justice Ginsburg described in her Coleman dissent, “[t]he ‘pervasive sex-role stere-
otype that caring for family members is women’s work’ . . . [leads] employers to
regard parental and family-care leave as a women’s benefit.” Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at
1347 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (quoting Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 731). The same has been
said of flexible work policies. See, e.g., Vicki Schultz, Feminism and Workplace Flexi-
bility, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1203, 1215 (2010) (“To the extent that it is associated with
women’s needs and with family caretaking, workplace flexibility will assume—in-
deed, already has assumed—a gendered character and meaning.”). See also JAMES A.
LEVINE & TODD L. PITTINSKY, WORKING FATHERS: NEW STRATEGIES FOR BAL-
ANCING WORK AND FAMILY 58, 60 (1997); National Study, supra note 6, at 41.
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gues that family-friendly policies designed for working parents are really
understood to be mother-friendly policies designed for working mothers.94
He finds that “society . . . has defined work-family so exclusively as a
women’s issue” that policies targeting this conflict are seen by both employ-
ers and employees as policies designed for women.95 One of the significant
findings of a 2012 study by the Families and Work Institute was that
“[o]rganizations where women make up less than 25% of the employees are
more likely to have a low level of flexibility than organizations where
women represent a larger share of the workforce.”96 The same study found
that a high percentage of women in the workforce is one of the characteris-
tics that predicts whether an employer will have flexible scheduling policies,
providing additional evidence that employers design flexible work policies
with women in mind.97
The government’s current treatment of flexible scheduling provides
further evidence that flexible scheduling is seen as a policy for women. In
2010, the White House Council on Women and Girls hosted the White
House Workplace Flexibility Forum.98 The Women’s Bureau of the U.S.
Department of Labor hosted the resulting National Dialogue on Workplace
Flexibility.99 In a hearing before the Senate, the Director of the Women’s
Bureau stated that “[s]ecuring a flexible workplace for women and families
is essential to balancing the daily demands of work and personal
life . . . .”100 The government’s own framing of flexibility reinforces the idea
that flexible work policies are viewed as women’s policies.
But even if employers formulate flexible work policies with the belief
that women will use them more or derive more benefit from them than men
do, to have unconstitutional discrimination, employers must act on these
beliefs in the administration of their flexible work policies.
One might expect such a stereotypical framework for flexible schedul-
ing to result in far more women working flexible schedules than men. Statis-
tical evidence about the percentages of men and women working flexible
schedules does not reveal such a discrepancy.101 A 2004 study by the Fami-
lies and Work Institute found that 68% of men and 79% of women who
94. LEVINE & PITTINSKY, supra note 93.
95. Id. at 60.
96. National Study, supra note 6, at 41.
97. Id. at 7.
98. Workplace Flexibility, supra note 5.
99. Id. at 2.
100. Balancing Work and Family in the Recession: How Employees are Coping: Hearing
Before the Joint Econ. Comm., 111th Cong. 71 (2009) (statement of Karen Nuss-
baum, Director, Women’s Bureau of the United States Department of Labor).
101. Victoria Brescoll, Jennifer Glass & Alexandra Sedlovskaya, Ask and Ye Shall Receive?
The Dynamics of Employer-Provided Flexible Work Options and the Need for Public
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have access to flexibility use it.102 A 2006 study by Corporate Voices for
Working Families found that men and women use flexible work policies at a
similar rate across income levels, with middle-income men using them at a
slightly higher rate than middle-income women.103 These data do not sup-
port an argument that employers administer their flexible scheduling poli-
cies in a discriminatory way.
One could argue that these data are not representative of the adminis-
tration of flexible scheduling policies by state employers since the studies
involved looked only at private employees. However, a 2004 study by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics supports the finding that men and women work
flexible schedules at comparable levels across the spectrum of private-public
employment. The Bureau of Labor Statistics study not only included state
government employees but looked at these employees in a separate cate-
gory.104 This study found that 30.7% of male state government employees
worked flexible schedules, while 26.6% of female state government employ-
ees worked flexible schedules.105
In a June 2013 study, Professors Victoria Brescoll, Jennifer Glass, and
Alexandra Sedlovskaya address the appearance of gender parity in flexible
scheduling. They explain that “flexible schedules are more commonly availa-
ble to workers in high-status positions of authority and in managerial and
professional occupations,” which are positions most frequently occupied by
men.106 Thus, “[t]he combination of lower availability among mothers but
[higher rates of use] when available leads to rough gender parity between
men and women in the use of flexible scheduling on a regular basis.”107 But
even with this explanation, these statistics cannot be used to support an
argument that employers grant flexible schedules in a discriminatory way.
While the raw data regarding who works flexible schedules do not sup-
port an argument of discriminatory administration, the data regarding re-
sponses to requests for flexible schedules does support the argument.
Policy, 69 J. SOCIAL ISSUES (SPECIAL ISSUE) 367, 370 (2013) (citing the “rough
gender parity between women and men using flexible scheduling on a regular basis”).
102. James T. Bond, Ellen Galinsky & E. Jeffrey Hill, When Work Works: A Status Report
on Workplace Flexibility, FAMILIES & WORK INST. 6 (2004), http://familiesandwork.
org/3w/research/downloads/status.pdf.
103. Shelley Waters Boots & Anna Danziger, Urban Inst., A Comparison of Men’s and
Women’s Access to and Use of FWAs, WORKPLACE FLEXIBILITY 2010 1–2 (Apr. 30,
2008), http://workplaceflexibility2010.org/images/uploads/FWAComparisonbyGen-
der.pdf.
104. See Workers on Flexible and Shift Schedules in May 2004, BUREAU OF LABOR STATIS-
TICS 6 (July 1, 2005, 10:00 AM), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/flex.pdf.
105. Id.
106. Brescoll et al., supra note 101.
107. Id.
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The study published by Professors Brescoll, Glass, and Sedlovskaya
found that managers were more likely to grant flexibility requests from
high-status male workers who asked for the flexible schedule for reasons
related to career advancement, such as taking professional development clas-
ses, than they were to grant requests from female workers for the same rea-
son.108 The authors hypothesize the following:
[T]he signaling association between female gender and family
care may be so strong that even high-status women seeking ac-
commodations to advance their careers might be suspected of
either dissembling their reason for the accommodation or less
deserving of the chance to gain further training because they will
withdraw or lower their work effort at some point in the
future.109
The study also found that low-status male workers were more likely to have
caregiving-based requests for flexible schedules granted than high-status
male workers.110 Significantly, “[w]omen, irrespective of their reason for re-
questing flextime and their status, were less likely than high-status men to
have their request granted.”111 The authors conclude that “women work-
ers . . . faced a gendered wall of resistance to their requests for schedule
flexibility.”112
Unlike in Hibbs where, “[b]ecause employers continued to regard the
family as the woman’s domain, they often denied men similar accommoda-
tions or discouraged them from taking leave,”113 this study shows that the
reverse is true with flexible scheduling—it is women whose requests for
flexible scheduling are denied.114 Despite this difference in outcome, the
source of the discrimination is still “invalid gender stereotypes” that affect
women in the workplace.115 For example, employers may deny women leave
because of the explicit emphasis women place on their family care obliga-
tions, or because employers automatically assume women are requesting
leave for caregiving reasons.116
This study provides evidence for a congressional finding of unconsti-
tutional gender discrimination by state employers in the administration of
108. Id. at 371, 381.
109. Id. at 382.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 383.
112. Id. at 384.
113. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003).
114. Brescoll et al., supra note 101, at 384.
115. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 730.
116. Brescoll et al., supra note 101, at 370.
376 M I C H I G A N  J O U R N A L  O F  G E N D E R &  L A W [Vol. 20:359
their facially neutral flexible scheduling policies. For the Court to find that
Congress has a sufficient evidentiary basis to abrogate state immunity under
the Enforcement Clause, however, there would likely need to be more stud-
ies supporting this finding and more evidence that discrimination by state
employers compares to that by private employers.117 While the study by
Brescoll, Glass, and Sedlovskaya is unlikely alone to be a sufficient basis for
the Court to uphold the WFFA under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, it provides an in-road for an argument that the WFFA targets gender
discrimination in the administration of States’ existing flexible scheduling
policies.
Option 3: Discrimination against Women who Already Work
Flexible Schedules
Another source of intentional gender discrimination in flexible sched-
uling may be found in how employees are treated after they begin working a
flexible schedule. Evidence indicates that even if flexible schedules are availa-
ble, some workers avoid using them because of the stigma attached to work-
ing a flexible schedule.118 Thirty-nine percent of employees polled in the
Families and Work Institute’s 2004 study stated that employees who use
flexible work options are “less likely to get ahead in their jobs or careers.”119
The same study found that 43% of working parents believe that working a
flexible schedule will have a negative effect on their careers, while only 35%
of non-parents believe this.120 These data show that employees believe that
their peers who work flexible schedules suffer discrimination, and those who
self-identify as caregivers report this sentiment in higher numbers.
While both men and women may fear that using a flexible schedule
will have a negative effect on their job advancement, women have an addi-
tional reason to be anxious. Given the persistent stereotype that women
117. In Justice Ginsberg’s dissent in Coleman, she highlighted that, although many studies
were of the experiences of private sector employees, there was ample evidence for
“Congress . . . to believe that a pattern of workplace discrimination against pregnant
women existed in public-sector employment, just as it did in the private sector.”
Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1343–44 (2012) (Ginsberg,
J., dissenting).
118. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 78, at 94 (quoting a report written for the Glass
Ceiling Commission) (“Many employees and employers view the use of family-
friendly policies and the desire for career advancement as mutually exclusive
choices.”); Brescoll et al., supra note 101, at 370 (“Narrative accounts of workers
afraid to use their employer’s flexibility policies because they believe their work ca-
reers would suffer as a result are plentiful.”).
119. Bond et al., supra note 102.
120. Id.
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who are mothers are less competent121 and less committed to their work,122
women are also concerned about their job security. As the Court pointed
out in Hibbs, “[s]tereotypes about women’s domestic roles . . . foster[ ] em-
ployers’ stereotypical views about women’s commitment to work and their
value as employees.”123 Professors Joan Williams and Cynthia Thomas Cal-
vert argue that employer biases that caregivers do not make good workers
may be reinforced when a mother requests a flexible schedule.124 Williams
and Calvert find that switching to a flexible work schedule is one of the
main triggers of bias against women as mothers, which can manifest as, for
example, the provision of less challenging assignments, more stringent per-
formance evaluations, or harsher workplace disciplinary action.125
To address this problem, the WFFA would have to be changed sub-
stantively. One critical change would be amending the “Prohibited Acts”
section to prohibit not only retaliation against employees who have re-
quested flexible schedules but discrimination against employees who have
been granted them.126 Just as the Act currently allows equitable relief for
retaliation against employees for exercising rights under the Act, it could
also allow equitable relief for retaliation against employees who have been
granted flexible schedules, “including employment reinstatement, promo-
tion, back pay, and a change in the terms or conditions of employment.”127
Such a change to the statute would reinforce that employees who use flexi-
ble schedules are not to be stigmatized. It would be a step toward addressing
a major concern of employees who consider requesting or utilizing flexible
schedules.
The addition of this provision would make upholding the WFFA
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment more plausible, given the
evidence of discrimination against women who move to working flexible
schedules.128 With the aforementioned anti-retaliation provision added to
the WFFA, the Court could find that Congress acted upon evidence that
121. See, e.g., John Williams & Cynthia Thomas Calvert, Emerging Family Responsibilities
Claims Under the Family and Medical Leave Act and Sex Discrimination Laws, in
LITIGATING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND EMPLOYMENT-RELATED CLAIMS
AND DEFENSES IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 23, 31–32 (2007).
122. See, e.g., Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003); see also
Brescoll et al., supra note 101, at 371.
123. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736.
124. See Williams & Calvert, supra note 121, at 27.
125. Id. at 31–35; Brescoll et al., supra note 101, at 371.
126. See Working Families Flexibility Act, S. 2142, 112th Cong. § 6(b) (2012).
127. See S. 2142, § 8(a)(2).
128. See, e.g., Williams & Calvert, supra note 121, at 30–33; see also Tara Siegal Bernard,
The Unspoken Stigma of Workplace Flexibility, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2013), http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/06/15/your-money/the-unspoken-stigma-of-workplace-
flexibility.html?_r=1&.
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States were violating the constitutional right to be free from gender discrim-
ination in the workplace with their discriminatory treatment of female em-
ployees who currently work flexible schedules. The addition of a provision
to protect these employees would allow Congress to frame the WFFA as
necessary “to eliminate . . . [the] perpetuation of . . . invalid stereotypes, and
thereby dismantle persisting gender-based barriers to the . . . retention[ ]
and promotion of women in the workplace.”129 This congressional purpose
was upheld in Hibbs as a reasonable basis for Congress’ regulation of state
family-leave laws with the FMLA.130 Congress would still need a strong
record in its legislative history of retaliation against women working flexible
schedules, but this angle to the WFFA would strengthen the basis for up-
holding the Act under Section 5.
B. Congruence and Proportionality
Even if the Court finds unconstitutional state discrimination against
women who request or work flexible schedules, the remedy provided by the
Act must still be congruent and proportional to the injury to be prevented
in order to be a valid abrogation of state sovereign immunity under Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.131 In other words, the appropriate scope
of the legislation depends on the scope of the problem it is designed to
address. For example, in Tennessee v. Lane, the Court found that the “re-
quirement of program accessibility” in Title II of the ADA was “congruent
and proportional to its object of enforcing the right of access to the
courts.”132 The Court made clear, however, that part of the proportionality
of the legislation was that the remedy was limited: Title II only required
“reasonable modifications [to accommodate those with disabilities] . . . and
only when the individual seeking modification is otherwise eligible for the
service.”133
In Hibbs, the Court found that the family-leave provision in the
FMLA was congruent and proportional to its goal of remedying unconstitu-
tional gender discrimination in the workplace for several reasons.134 First,
because Congress had already tried attacking the problem of gender dis-
crimination in the workplace with Title VII and had “confronted a ‘difficult
and intractable problem,’” the FMLA’s format as a universal benefit was
129. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 734 n.10 (2003).
130. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 734 n.10.
131. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 508 (1997).
132. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 531 (2004).
133. Lane, 541 U.S. at 532.
134. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 737–40.
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justified.135 The Court explained that “[b]y creating an across-the-board,
routine employment benefit for all eligible employees, Congress sought to
ensure that family-care leave would no longer be stigmatized as an inordi-
nate drain on the workplace caused by female employees, and that employ-
ers could not evade leave obligations simply by hiring men.”136 Second, the
provision was “narrowly targeted at the faultline [sic] between work and
family—precisely where sex-based overgeneralization has been and remains
strongest—and affects only one aspect of the employment relationship.”137
Finally, the Court found significant the fact that Congress had included a
number of other limitations on the FMLA’s scope, such as requiring only
unpaid leave, excluding certain employees from eligibility, and limiting the
number of weeks of leave to twelve.138
Like the FMLA, the WFFA is “narrowly targeted at the faultline [sic]
between work and family—precisely where sex-based overgeneralization has
been and remains strongest—and affects only one aspect of the employment
relationship.”139 The WFFA is likewise limited in its scope, and actually
even more so than the FMLA: while the FMLA provides employees with a
right to family leave and requires employers to grant this leave, the WFFA
provides employees only a right to request flexible work arrangements and
requires employers only to engage in a discussion with the employee about
this request.140 This limitation could be compared to how the Title II of the
ADA requires only “reasonable modifications” by States.141
The limited scope of the WFFA raises a potential problem for justify-
ing why the WFFA is written as a universal benefit, granting an affirmative
right to both men and women, rather than as a traditional anti-discrimina-
tion statute, simply forbidding discrimination against a protected group.
On one hand, the justification in Hibbs does not map perfectly given that
the WFFA does not require that employers provide flexible schedules. The
justification in Hibbs suggests that the WFFA might be more congruent and
135. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 737.
136. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 737.
137. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 738.
138. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 738–40.
139. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 738–39.
140. Working Families Flexibility Act, S. 2142, 112th Cong. § 6(b) (2012). While the
Court has struck down prophylactic legislation for applying too “broadly to every
aspect of state employers’ operations,” the Court has never struck down legislation as
incongruent for applying too narrowly. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 738 (citing City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62
(2000); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001)).
141. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 532 (2004).
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proportional if it mandated that employers provide flexible schedules.142 On
the other hand, given the fact that the States’ constitutional violation con-
sists of discriminating against female employees who ask to use, or are cur-
rently using, the states’ existing policies, the WFFA could be amended to
simply ban gender-based discrimination against those who request or work
flexible schedules.
The point of, and need for, a universal benefit is to normalize request-
ing and working flexible schedules. To promote true workplace equality,
flexibility must no longer be seen as an anomaly from the existing, tradi-
tional employment structure.
Discrimination analysis is designed to ensure that no one is de-
nied equal opportunity within the existing structure; it is not
designed to change the structure to the least discriminatory,
most opportunity-maximizing pattern. Discrimination analysis is
geared to providing the same opportunity for all, not the best
opportunity for all . . . . The discrimination model is tied only to
the elimination of structural flaws, not to the creation of a fairer,
more accessible or more humane structure.143
For flexible scheduling policies to promote true workplace equality, flexibil-
ity must become a normal part of the employment structure. The universal
benefit that the WFFA provides is critical to achieving this goal. As Profes-
sor Dowd articulates, anti-discrimination laws aim to give everyone equal
access to the existing structures.144 When the existing structures themselves
promote inequality and Congress wants to address this inequality, Congress
must find alternative ways to do so. Providing a universal right to request a
flexible schedule is one such way Congress can address the inequality pre-
sent in the current employment system. This right is designed to address
unconstitutional state discrimination, and it is congruent and proportional
to the identified constitutional violation, because anti-discrimination legis-
lation would be ineffective in addressing this particular problem.
142. Given the difficulty this would pose for some types of workplaces, however, such a
requirement would be unlikely to be viewed as “limited.” Lane, 541 U.S. at 531. See
generally Brescoll et al., supra note 101, at 385 (noting that “While [‘right to ask’
laws] may not be strong enough to overcome the resistance to schedule flexibility for
women uncovered here, at minimum, they force some reflection on the part of man-
agers who may otherwise respond with . . . gender-biased beliefs.”).
143. Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: The Gender Paradox and the Limitations of Dis-
crimination Analysis in Restructuring the Workplace, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79,
139 (1989).
144. Id.
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III. “WORK-LIFE,” NOT “WORK FAMILY:” DECOUPLING FLEXIBLE
SCHEDULING AND CAREGIVING
One major feminist critique of flexible scheduling is that, rather than
helping working women, “flexibility has the potential to undermine equal-
ity” in the workplace.145 Professor Vicki Schultz argues that allowing an
individual worker to sidestep traditional workplace norms through the use
of flexibility does not eliminate these norms.146 Schultz claims that “it is
likely that women will disproportionately opt for [flexible scheduling]
choices,” which will cause “workplace flexibility . . . [to] assume . . . a
gendered character and meaning.”147 While the studies discussed in Part II
do not support the assumption that women will disproportionately be the
employees who request or are granted flexible schedules,148 Schultz is correct
in her statement that workplace flexibility “will assume—indeed, already
has assumed—a gendered character and meaning.”149 This gendered charac-
ter threatens to undermine the goal of using flexible scheduling as a means
for women to avoid being forced to choose between having a family and
having a successful career.
Even if flexible scheduling policies are written in gender-neutral lan-
guage, when they are framed as policies to facilitate “work-family” balance,
or to help employees with caregiving responsibilities, this framing reinforces
the gendered nature of the policy. As discussed in Part II, childcare is still
primarily the responsibility of women.150 The impact that this responsibility
has on women’s careers “is only reinforced by the perpetuation of gender
stereotypes evident in references to . . . jobs that accommodate parental
needs as . . . ’mommy tracks.’”151 Caregiving for elderly or disabled family
members is also done primarily by women.152 When flexible scheduling is
associated with caregiving, it takes on a gendered character in the minds of
employers. Even if men use flexible work policies at similar percentage rates
145. Schultz, supra note 93, at1203.
146. Id. at 1214.
147. Id. at 1203.
148. See Bond et al., supra note 102; Boots and Danziger, supra note 103, at 1; Workers on
Flexible and Shift Schedules in May 2004, supra note 104, at 6.
149. Schultz, supra note 93, at 1215. See, e.g., LEVINE & PITTINSKY, supra note 93; Bal-
ancing Work and Family in the Recession: How Employees are Coping: Hearing Before
the Joint Econ. Comm., 111th Cong. 1 (2009) (statement of Karen Nussbaum, Direc-
tor, Women’s Bureau of the United States Department of Labor).
150. Powell, supra note 12. See, e.g., Galinsky et al., supra note 12.
151. Martin Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave Revisited, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 25, 32
(1998) (attributing the origin of the term “mommy track” to Felice N. Schwartz,
Management Women and the New Facts of Life, HARV. BUS. REV. 65 (1989), http://
hbr.org/1989/01/management-women-and-the-new-facts-of-life/ar ).
152. See Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 738 n.10 (2003).
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with women, or are actually granted flexible schedules at higher rates than
women, as long as flexible scheduling is viewed as a policy for women with
caregiving needs, women who use it risk hurting their career prospects.153 As
Schultz argues, the view that flexibility is a women’s policy “will tend to
exacerbate women’s marginalized status rather than improve it.”154
In order for flexible scheduling not to be viewed as a policy only for
women, thus reinforcing gender stereotypes and inequality in the work-
place, it needs to be requested by, and granted to, both men and women,155
both parents and non-parents.156 To actualize this scenario, the mentality
surrounding flexible scheduling needs to move away from a model based on
easing work-family conflict and toward a model based on helping all people
achieve a better work-life balance generally.
The primary way to attack the stereotypes currently associated with
flexible scheduling, and thus to combat discrimination against women who
work flexible schedules, is to decouple the concept of flexible scheduling
from caregiving responsibilities. This decoupling will not occur simply by
prohibiting discrimination against those already working flexible schedules.
It will only occur when a critical mass of workers—men and women, par-
ents and non-parents—work flexible schedules so that flexible scheduling is
the norm, not the anomaly. While Professor Schultz is correct that
“[a]llowing individuals to opt out of an existing set of norms . . . does not
necessarily change those norms,”157 if enough people opt out so as to change
what is seen as the standard pattern of behavior, the norm will change as
well.
153. See Dwyer Gunn, The Flex Time Ruse: Does Working Flexibly Harm Women?, SLATE
(Mar. 28, 2013, 8:06 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2013/
03/flex_time_is_not_the_answer.html (arguing that women’s career progress is hurt
by working a flexible schedule because of the stigma associated with flexible work
policies). See also Brescoll et al., supra note 101, at 370.
154. Schultz, supra note 93, at 1216. See also Bernard, supra note 128.
155. Men who request flexible schedules are more likely to hide that they are changing
their schedule for reasons related to childcare. Powell, supra note 12, at 167. When
men do not want to admit to their employers that they are requesting a flexible
schedule for childcare reasons, it may discourage them from requesting it at all. See
Chuck Halverson, From Here to Paternity: Why Men Are Not Taking Paternity Leave
under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 18 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 257, 271 (2003)
(“Social stigma is the main hurdle to men taking FMLA paternity leave.”). It may
also further brand women who work flexible schedules with the stereotypes that
come with being a working mother. See Williams & Calvert, supra note 121, at 27;
Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736.
156. See Bernard, supra note 128 (“For women to be able to take advantage of these
arrangements without judgment, men need to use them freely, too.”); Bond et al.,
supra note 102.
157. Schultz, supra note 93, at 1214.
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If the goal of flexible scheduling is to promote work-life, rather than
work-family, balance, the WFFA has a critical problem. The WFFA is
framed through its title—the Working Families Flexibility Act—and
through its factual findings158 and legislative history159 as a policy to help
caregivers. This framing risks entrenching, and possibly worsening, the
gendered character of flexible scheduling. As long as caregiving is associated
with women, making “caregivers” or “working families” the intended bene-
ficiaries of the policy will mean that flexible scheduling is understood as a
policy for women.
One step in creating a statute that promotes actual workplace equality
is changing the name of the WFFA to something that frames it as a policy
to promote work-life balance for all employees. For example, it could be
called the Work-Life Balance Act. Another step would be to eliminate the
factual findings about the needs of caregivers for workplace flexibility. As
shown by the discussion in Part II, findings about the unique needs of
caregivers—let alone the unique needs of women—are not necessary (and
not sufficient) for upholding the Act under the Fourteen Amendment.
Rather, it would be sufficient to add the additional anti-retaliation provision
discussed above and legislative history documenting the current problems
with discrimination against women requesting and working flexible
schedules.
A potential paradox arises, however, with the need to pass such a stat-
ute under the auspices of the Fourteenth Amendment. This constitutional
basis requires arguing that the Act is designed to prevent unconstitutional
gender discrimination. At the same time, however, structuring the Act as a
universal benefit targeted at “work-life balance” is necessary to normalize
flexible scheduling and decouple the idea of flexibility from gender. Using
the Fourteenth Amendment as the basis for the Act risks re-forging the very
link between gender and flexible scheduling that the Act works to destroy.
One response to this paradox is that the effect of the Act on society’s
view of flexible work is unlikely to be determined by the section of the
Constitution under which the Act is upheld. Just as it is functionally irrele-
vant to those who are compelled to purchase health insurance under the
Affordable Care Act whether the individual mandate was upheld under the
Commerce Clause or the Taxing Clause,160 it likely will be irrelevant to
employees exercising their rights under the hypothetical “Work-Life Balance
158. Working Families Flexibility Act, S. 2142, 112th Cong. § 2 (2012).
159. See, e.g., 158 CONG. REC. E282-03 (daily ed. Feb. 29, 2012) (statement of Rep.
Carolyn B. Maloney).
160. See generally Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012) (uphold-
ing the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act under the Taxing Clause and
finding that the Act would be unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause).
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Act” whether that right was upheld under the Commerce Clause or the
Enforcement Clause. What will matter is that they are exercising a right that
was created by Congress to help all Americans achieve a better work-life
balance, rather than a right created to help caregivers (i.e., women) balance
work with family responsibilities.
Another option is to abandon efforts to frame the Act under the Four-
teenth Amendment altogether. As discussed in Part I, Congress could give a
private right of action to private employees under the Commerce Clause.161
The bill is already well framed to do so given the factual findings about the
positive effects of flexible scheduling on businesses.162 A consequence would
be that public employees are relegated to the DOL complaint system, which
as discussed in Part I, is not ideal.163 However, granting a private right of
action to private employees would still cover the majority of American
workers. Abandoning efforts to grant a private right of action to state em-
ployees would mean that Congress would not have to make any findings
about discrimination against women; indeed, Congress could, if politically
capable, avoid any specific mention of women and caregiving. Passing the
Act under the Commerce Clause would allow Congress to focus on poten-
tial gains for American businesses and American “work-life balance” gener-
ally. As discussed above, this tactic might go furthest in promoting gender
equality in the workplace.
CONCLUSION
Writer, mother, and flex-worker Dwyn Gunn argues, “[r]educing the
stigma associated with . . . flexible work arrangements that can help facili-
tate women’s careers may be the best way to improve gender equality in the
U.S.”164 This Note proposes that a federal law aimed at facilitating and,
most importantly, normalizing the use of flexible schedules in American
workplaces would be a valuable step toward gender equality. The WFFA as
currently written has serious shortcomings, both from an enforcement per-
spective and from an equality perspective. Two changes would enhance the
Act’s ability to advance gender equality in the workplace and improve work-
life balance for workers of all types: (1) an additional anti-retaliation provi-
sion to target discrimination against those who work flexible schedules, and
(2) an emphasis on work-life balance rather than work-family balance. 
161. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72–73 (1996); Alden v. Maine,
527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999).
162. S. 2142, § 2(8)–(13).
163. See Lueke, supra note 39, at 217–18.
164. Gunn, supra note 153.
